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1. Introduction
The European Commission has recently issued the third
block group exemption Regulation on the application of
the competition rules in the motor vehicle distribution
sector.1 In line with its general policy concerning vertical
restraints,2 the European Commission holds the view
that, in the absence of market power, the overall benefits
from restrictions in the distribution of cars normally
exceed possible anti-competitive effects.3
However, the new rules for distribution agreements in
the EU car sector are stricter than the general rules
governing vertical restraints.4 The main reason for this
is that the Commission, by means of the new Regula-
tion, aims in particular at promoting innovation of
distribution formats, so far totally absent from the car
sector.5
The Commission explains6 the lack of innovation in
the car retailing sector by the fact that, on the one hand,
almost every car manufacturer in the EU employed the
same selective and exclusive distribution system
exempted by previous Regulations. On the other hand,
one of the conditions for the legitimacy of car distribu-
tion agreements under the previous sector-specific com-
petition rules was that retailers undertook to provide
repair services.7 As a consequence, retailers employing
alternative formats such as supermarkets and internet-
based firms were closed off, both because they did not
normally fulfil the selective criteria set by the manu-
facturers, and were not able to comply with the obliga-
tion to provide repair services deriving from the
exemption regime. In other words, the negative effect
caused by vertical restraints in this sector laid, according
to the Commission, not so much in the prejudice to the
functioning of competition between manufacturers, the
so called interbrand competition, but in the suppression
of innovation of distribution formats, that is the restric-
tion of dynamic intrabrand competition.
However, the specific remedies envisaged by the Com-
mission in order to foster retail innovation in the car
sector are far from being free of problems. In particular,
even though car manufacturers are given the choice
between a selective (both qualitative and quantitative)
and an exclusive distribution system, the vast majority
of them are currently opting for the selective system,8
and this could have the effect of perpetuating the
foreclosure effect of innovative retailers from the motor
vehicle distribution sector.
The question is raised whether, in order to foster
dynamic competition at the retail level, the banning of
the qualitative selective distribution system altogether
would have been a better choice, as authoritatively
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1 Reg.1400/2002 on the application of Art.81(3) of the Treaty
to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in
the motor vehicle sector ([2002] O.J. L203/30). The two pre-
vious Regs. were Reg.1475/95 ([1995] O.J. L145/25), which
expired on September 30, 2002, and prior to that Reg.123/85
([1985] O.J. L15/16).
2 General policy as derived from Reg.2790/1999 ([1999] O.J.
L336) and Guidelines on Vertical Restraints ([2000] O.J.
C291/1). In the absence of market power and up to a short list of
prohibited clauses (Arts 4 and 5 of Reg.2790/1999), manu-
facturers are in principle free to place whatever restrictions they
wish on their distributors. The central element here is the
recognition that in many cases such arrangements actually foster
increased efficiency through the achievement of savings in trans-
action and distribution costs, thereby possibly stimulating com-
petition between manufacturers of different makes—so called
interbrand competition, see Guidelines, paras 6 and 115–118.
3 Reg.1400/2002 at Recitals 5–8. As well as for Reg.2790/1999,
the exemption is conditioned on the fulfilment of a market share
threshold, fixed by the Commission in order to reflect suppliers’
market power, see Art.3(1) and (2) of Reg.1400/2002. Car
manufacturers holding a market share of more than 30 per cent
are not covered by the rules on vertical restraints, 40 per cent if
they operate qualitative and quantitative selective distribution.
4 Recital 2 of Reg.1400/2002.
5 Explanatory Brochure to Reg.1400/2002, available on the DG
COMP’s website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car_
sector/explanatory_brochure_en.pdf, p.14. Another important
matter the new rules deal with is the effect of the previous
regulation on price differences among States, an issue not directly
covered by the present paper.
6 See Report on the evaluation of Reg.1475/95 on the applica-
tion of Art.85(3) (now Art.81(3)) of the Treaty to certain
categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agree-
ments, Document COM (2000) 743 final, available on the DG
COMP’s website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car_
sector/, especially pt.142 and pt. 401–416.
7 Recital 4 and Art.5(1)(1)(a) of Reg.1475/95.
8 Sector Group at Houthoff Buruma and Liedekerke Wolters
Waelbroeck Kirkpartick, Flawed Reform of the Competition
Rules for the European Motor Vehicle Distribution Sector
[2003] E.C.L.R. 254, p.257.
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suggested.9 In order to answer this question, insights
from the more recent literature on the economics of
innovation and related studies might prove to be use-
ful.
2. The new regulatory framework for the EU
motor vehicle distribution sector
Need for a policy change
Since 1985, vertical restraints undergone by manu-
facturers and retailers in the distribution of motor
vehicles have been subject in the EU to a special
regime.10 The whole concept was centred on the belief
that the car was not an ordinary good. It was seen as a
highly complex product requiring expert repair and
maintenance work11 at regular and irregular intervals,
and at a range of locations.12 Therefore, supplier’s own
sales capacity and reputation would have been compro-
mised if cars had not been sold by dealers whose staff
had sufficient expertise and equipment to sell, service
and repair them to the right standard.13
Because of this, the Commission endorsed the neces-
sity of a network of closely co-operating partners, with
the dealers been obliged to also provide repair and
maintenance work.14 This involved not only a selection
of dealers according to qualitative criteria,15 but, essen-
tially because of the necessity to transfer the knowledge
required to repair and sell a car, a selection by the
manufacturer according to quantitative criteria.16 The
selective distribution system allowed manufacturers to
choose the dealerships they decided to supply, and to
forbid those dealerships to sell to retailers not belonging
to the same network. Moreover, the distribution could
also be exclusive, the exclusivity relating to the territory
in which the dealer could carry out sales without any
other dealer of that make being present. Dealers were
entitled to make passive sales to any consumers who
entered their showrooms or contacted them, but could
not actively seek customers outside their own territory.
Finally, dealers could sell different makes, provided that
they adopted some measures protective of the car-
maker’s brand and reputation.17
In a Report18 evaluating the working of Regulation
1475/95, issued after 15 years of this sector-specific
policy, the Commission questioned the wisdom of the
belief that, because of a car’s intrinsic characteristics, a
system of selective and exclusive distribution was (still)
required.19 Especially, a car’s peculiarities did not seem
to justify the negative effects on competition and market
integration that seemed to derive from the selective-
exclusive system,20 that is the closing-off of new dis-
tribution techniques such as internet sales,21 the
insufficient price competition between approved dealers
within the EU and the impediment to the cross border
purchases of new vehicles. It was also shown that
products that are comparable to cars, that is motor-
cycles, were distributed through less restrictive channels.
In particular, the Commission recognised that, since all
car manufacturers in the EU employed the same or
similar selective and exclusive distribution systems
exempted by the previous Regulation,22 there was prac-
tically no possibility of entry by retailers using a format
9 Reference is made in particular to the view expressed by the
UK Competition Commission, in New cars, A report on the
supply of new motor cars within the United Kingdom, presented
to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry by
Command of Her Majesty, April 2000, see under Section 2 for
further discussion of this Report’s results.
10 The Commission’s former competition policy on car distribu-
tion was laid down in Reg.125/85, and only partially amended
by the following Reg.1475/95, see n.1 above.
11 Otherwise cars could have represented a risk to life, limb and
the environment.
12 It was also maintained that customers generally preferred to
have a ‘‘one-stop shop’’ for their vehicle purchase and main-
tenance needs.
13 See Recital 4 of Reg.1475/95.
14 See Recital 4 and Art.5(1)(1)(a) of Reg.1475/95. This was
sustained also because of possible ‘‘cross-fertilisations’’ between
sale and servicing.
15 Selectivity was normally based on a mixture of technical and
economic criteria required from the distributors, such as exper-
tise, equipment and premises.
16 The underlying reasoning was that the car manufacturer
could only work with a limited number of dealers and repair
operators, if he wanted to be able to communicate extensively
with them, so that they would service the car in the manner
required.
17 Interestingly, the cumulative effect of similar vertical restric-
tions was not ignored by the two previous sector specific
Regulations (see Recital 3 of Reg.125/85 and of Reg.1475/95),
but no repeal mechanism was foreseen.
18 See Report on the evaluation of Reg.1475/95, as n.6
above.
19 The criticism expressed by the Commission in its Report
came apparently as a surprise to some car manufacturers, see
Buzzavo and Volpato, ‘‘Car Distribution in Europe: Between
Vertical Agreements and Customer Satisfaction’’ Cockeas
Research Network, Berlin Meeting, November 2001, p.6.
20 The Commission also refers to the fact that cars themselves
might have changed (in spite of their increased technological
complexity, servicing could have become easier—as big individ-
ual components can be replaced with greater ease—and in
general less frequently), as well as consumers’ wants and
expectations.
21 The Commission sees the internet as particularly important
because it serves also an integration scope, through developing
parallel trade on a much larger scale, with all the benefits that
would result from that, including a reduction in price differ-
entials between the Member States of the European Union, see
para.155 of the Report, n.6 above.
22 Selective and exclusive agreements covered most of the sales
in the market, but not all of them, because carmakers often
reserved to themselves some categories of buyers.
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that was on terms different from the ones found
throughout the industry.
The new rules
In the Commission’s opinion, in order to remedy these
problems, and especially to stimulate the development
of innovative distribution methods and thereby enhance
competition,23 the new rules for car distribution and
servicing in the EU had to be stricter than the general
framework for vertical restrictions, that is Regulation
2790/1999.24 The new rules’ specific aim would have
been inter alia promoting the access on the part of new
distribution formats to the market, with the Commis-
sion having especially two potential candidates in mind,
that is internet operators and supermarkets. Internet
operators, in particular, not only could permit the
offering to the consumers of new combinations of price
and services, but could contribute to price transparency
allowing the consumers to seek a competitive offer
beyond their local dealer. Supermarket sites were also
seen as able to enter the market and capture a significant
share at least of the market for commodity vehicles.25
Accordingly, whereas under the general policy on
vertical restraints, exclusive and selective arrangements
are exempted, unless the manufacturer has a market
share of more than 30 per cent,26 the same arrangements
are not covered by Regulation 1400/2002.27 The new
Regulation bans systems combining selective and exclu-
sive distribution and requires carmakers to choose one
of those distribution formats. This means that if a
manufacturer chooses the system of exclusive distribu-
tion, and for example assigns its dealers exclusive
geographic market areas, dealers may be prohibited
from opening additional outlets in markets covered by
such systems or carrying out active promotion (such as
local advertising or email promotions) outside their
sales area, but they are entitled to make passive sales,
that is to respond to unsolicited requests, in favour of
any end user or independent retailer, that is internet
operators.28 On the other hand, in a selective distribu-
tion system, cars can be sold only by dealers belonging
to the network, but nobody enjoys protection from
other resellers’ competition by means of exclusive terri-
tories or customer groups.29 This result is also assisted
by the abolition of the ‘‘location clause’’ permitting
manufacturers to require dealers to operate from a
specific location, however only after a two year transi-
tional period.30 After the transitional period has
expired, dealers within a selective system will then be
entitled to open branches or showrooms anywhere in
the internal market, whereas the car makers retain full
control over the car dealer’s primary establishment.31
Another important aspect of the new rules is that the
link between sales and service has now been broken.
The obligation that the dealer undertakes repair services
was at the heart of the previous regime. Regulation
1475/95 exempted distribution agreements for new cars
on the condition that the dealer not only undertook to
sell new vehicles, but also provided after sales servic-
ing.32 The new Regulation, instead, does not exempt
agreements that do not allow dealers to sub-contract
23 See the Explicatory Brochure to Reg.1400/2002, n.5 above,
p.14.
24 In a way, the new regulatory framework for the European car
distribution sector can be seen as a remedy issued to solve specific
problems, so that, once the problem is solved, the general rules
on vertical restrictions could apply. The interesting thing here is
that Reg.1400/2002 foresees at Art.6(1)(a) the withdrawal of the
exemption in case of a cumulative effect, that is, practically, if the
new rules happen to fail their scope.
25 These are generally the products of mass market manu-
facturers and are largely functional vehicles. Another major
problem was seen in the obstacles still persisting to the operation
of multi-branded dealerships.
26 See Art.4(b) point 3, Reg.2790/1999.
27 Similarly to the general Block Exemption Regulation on
vertical restraints, the new sector-specific exemption does not
foresee a list of permitted vertical restraints (the ‘‘white list
approach’’), but a list of vertical restraints which are not
exempted and whose presence in an arrangement brings to the
non exemption of the other parts of it (Art.4), as well as another
list of less serious vertical restraints (Art.5).
28 Whereas, according to the general rules exempting the com-
bination of exclusive and selective distribution, retailers can be
prevented from selling to non-authorised distributors, see
Art.4(b) third exception; see also Robert Whish, Competition
Law (London, 2001), p.585.
29 Whereas carmakers are prevented from cumulating selective
and exclusive restrictions, they cannot be forced to use the same
system throughout the EU. The restrictive effects of the two
systems should nevertheless be kept strictly separate. This means
that if a manufacturer chooses the system of exclusive distribu-
tion assigning its dealers exclusive geographic market areas, its
dealers are entitled to make passive sales to distributors located
in markets where selective distribution is used, that is, also to
unauthorised resellers. On the other hand, selected dealers must
be free to sell cars to other dealers and to consumers in territories
where the system of exclusive territories operates, see Recital 13
of Reg.1400/2002.
30 The prohibition of a location clause will then be applicable
from October 1, 2005. This proposal to postpone the imple-
mentation of this prohibition came from the European Parlia-
ment, and was motivated by the fact that, in view of the impact
of the changes, it was desirable to introduce the freedom of
establishment only after a suitable and clearly defined transi-
tional period. In particular, it was feared that this may have
threaten the existence of less well-funded small and medium
sized dealers, if they had to face competition in their immediate
neighbourhood without preparation and at short notice.
31 Explanatory Brochure, n.5 above, question 55.
32 Art.5(1)(a). More precisely, the exemption applied only if the
dealer undertook to honour the supplier’s warranties and obliga-
tions for servicing and recall work, and to provide other repair
and maintenance services needed for the safe and reliable func-
tioning of the supplier’s brand of cars, irrespective of where the
cars were bought.
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servicing and repair to authorised repairers who belong
to the repair network of the brand in question,33 and in
that way practically unbundles servicing and distribu-
tion of new cars. According to the new rules, therefore,
the dealer has the choice either to offer after sales
services himself or to sub-contract independent,
approved repairers for the performance of after sales
service.34 Manufacturers have the obligation to supply
necessary technical information, diagnostic equipment
and tools, and training to independent repairers.35
Multi-branding is also reinforced under the new
Regulation. The principle that dealers should be free to
sell different makes was first stated in Regulation
1475/95. Whereas the supplier was prohibited from
entering into agreements that imposed an obligation on
its retailers to sell exclusively the supplier’s brand of new
cars, dealers wishing to sell multiple brands could be
asked to do so under separate legal entities, with
separate management and sales personnel or premises
for each brand. According to the new rules, instead,
suppliers should restrict themselves to imposing an
obligation for motor vehicles of different brands to be
exhibited in different areas of the same showroom.36
A last issue of importance to the Commission is the
protection of dealers’ economic independence. The eval-
uation Report on the functioning of Regulation 1475/95
had in fact revealed that the dealers were still largely
dependent on the manufacturers, and this despite the
protection measures introduced in their favour by pre-
vious Regulations. The idea behind the provision of
rules aiming at protecting dealers’ economic independ-
ence is, according to the Commission, that an independ-
ent dealer sector is more likely to engage in
pro-competitive behaviour and to be more innovative,
to the benefit of consumers. With this purpose in mind,
the Commission has set out a number of provisions that
the parties are to incorporate into their agreement if
they wish to benefit from the exemption. According to
the new rules, the right of the supplier to terminate the
contract of distribution is further restricted. Every
notice of termination of a contract issued by a manu-
facturer must be written and clearly state the reasons for
termination (‘‘detailed, objective and transparent rea-
sons’’).37 In case the dealer contests the reasons given
and asserts that they are not justified (that is because the
carmaker’s actual motivation is its wish to put an end to
the dealer’s multi-brand sales), it will be up to the
national courts or arbitrators to decide. The purpose of
this requirement is to prevent suppliers from terminat-
ing an agreement for reasons that are incompatible with
Art.81(1) EC and which cannot be exempted. In addi-
tion, the new Regulation provides, in line with Regula-
tion 1475/95, that for contract’s termination one year’s
notice has to be given if a network is re-organised or if
compensation is paid to the dealer, and two years’ notice
has to be given in all other cases.38 Moreover, dealers
should have the ability to transfer their rights and
obligations to other dealers authorised to sell the same
brand, and by that to realise the value that they have
built up.39 Finally, the mandatory dispute settlement
method introduced by Regulation 1475/95 has been
broadened in scope, now comprising all disputes about
the parties’ contractual obligations.40
The likely implementation of the new rules
The new Regulation has introduced a number of sub-
stantial changes as regards the compliance of motor
vehicle distribution agreements with EU competition
rules. Even though these provisions are not mandatory
per se,41 the parties, in order to avoid being confronted
with Art.81(1) and (2) of the Treaty will, in most cases,
comply with the exemption requirements. To benefit
from the block exemption, all existing agreements must
adapt to the new rules until September 30, 2003.
Because of the major changes introduced by the Regula-
tion, many suppliers have decided to reorganise their
distribution network.42
An appraisal of the new rules as regards to the
fulfilment of their specific aims, and in particular the
aim to promote the access on the part of new distribu-
tion formats to the market, is at the present stage still
very uncertain. Regulation 1400/2002 quite correctly
does not prescribe carmakers and retailers how they
should organise their networks, so that what will be the
result of the re-organisations actually in progress cannot
in principle be predicted.
33 Art.4(1)(g) of Reg.1400/2002.
34 Becoming a service only outlet is expected to provide a
commercial lifeline to dealers being terminated by manufacturers
in light of the continuing decline in the number of dealers.
Also in this respect the new rules are stricter than those of
Reg.2790/1999, which would not have secured any such access
to independent repairers
35 Also in this respect the new rules are stricter than those of
BER 2790/1999, which would not have secured any such access
to independent repairers.
36 Art.5(1)(a) and (c) of Reg.1400/2002. See Recital 27 for
more exempted obligations.
37 Art.3(4) of Reg.1400/2002.
38 Art.3(5)(b) of Reg.1400/2002.
39 Art.3(3) of Reg.1400/2002.
40 Art.3(6) of Reg.1400/2002.
41 See Case C–10/86 VAG France SA v Etablissements Magne
SA (1986) E.C.R. 4071; [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 98, ECJ.
42 See Automotive Sector Group at Houthoff Buruma and
Liedekerke Wolters Waelbroeck Kirkpartick, n.8 above, at
p.254.
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However, it appears that at the present stage car-
makers, with very few exceptions, are opting for the
qualitative and quantitative selective distribution sys-
tem.43 The stated reason for this popular choice is that
the exclusive distribution system (the other option) does
not allow carmakers to control the qualitative require-
ments of their dealers. In fact, if carmakers can impose
qualitative requirements on their exclusive dealers, they
cannot prevent them from selling to independent dealers
that are not required to adhere to these requirements.
This means that, choosing the qualitative44 selective
distribution system, carmakers can still be able to decide
who is going to sell their products and by that refuse to
sell to retailers like internet operators or supermar-
kets.45 Moreover, whereas the exemption of other verti-
cal restraints is subject to a market share threshold,
there is no such limit for pure qualitative selective
distribution.46 However, if it is proven that access to the
retail market, or competition therein, is significantly
restricted by the cumulative effect of parallel networks
of similar vertical restrictions, such as qualitative selec-
tion provisions, the Commission may decide to with-
draw the benefit of Regulation 1400/2002.47
The policy approach of the European Commission as
regards qualitative selection distribution is in line with
the principle set out by the European Court of Justice
stating that selective distribution systems normally fall
outside Art.81(1), provided that some conditions are
satisfied.48 However, the same Court has recognised that
there may be a restriction of competition where the
existence of a number of such systems does not leave
any room for other forms of distribution.49 Underlying
this there is the belief that even if vertical restrictions,
individually taken, can be seen as efficiency enhancing
means by which to organise vertical relations between
undertakings, their cumulative foreclosure effect could
hinder innovation of distribution formats.50 Thus,
whereas according to the Court, selective distribution,
individually taken, either lacks anti-competitive effects
(qualitative) or normally has a positive effect on static
efficiency, in the sense that they might achieve econo-
mies in the form of the saving of transaction or distribu-
tion costs (quantitative), the wide spread employment of
these restrictions could prevent the emerging of new
forms of retailing and by that hinder dynamic effi-
ciency.
From the point of view of antitrust policy, the above
mentioned situation would seem to require a trade-off
between static and dynamic efficiency, and this is what
the UK Competition Commission has proposed to do.51
In an inquiry which stemmed originally from consumer
complaints about high retail prices for cars in the UK,
the Competition Commission had come to the conclu-
sion that innovative formats of retailing, in particular
supermarkets and internet based retailers, had been
prevented from accessing the car distribution market
essentially because every manufacturer in the sector
operated the same quantitative and qualitative distribu-
tion system exempted by Regulation 1475/95. ‘‘To
enable suppliers to impose their own desired standards
could hinder or prevent the evolution of retailing in line
with consumer preferences and deter entry by retailers
with new ideas, such as the development of virtual
dealerships based on use of the internet’’.52 In view of
the fact that the UK Competition Authority considered
43 ibid. at p.257. Under the new rules, as we have seen above,
carmakers cannot cumulate selective with exclusive vertical
restrictions. This means that if, e.g. suppliers want to opt for the
selective distribution system, they cannot grant their dealers
exclusive territories or customers’ groups.
44 Carmakers can also restrict the number of dealers belonging
to the selective distribution network by imposing quantitative
selection criteria, see Reg.1400/2002, Art.1(1)(g). Carmakers
may limit the number of dealers, appointing one dealer meeting
a qualitative selection for each territory, but these dealers are not
protected from competition from other selective dealers, who
may actively sell to consumers in that territory.
45 However, qualitative criteria such as for example to design
retail space according to supplier directives should not be applied
in a discriminatory manner, see Reg.1400/2002, Art.1(1)(h).
46 Reg.1400/2002, Art.3(1). ‘‘Genuine’’ qualitative selection
criteria do not directly limit the number of distributors, see
Art.1(1)(h). Combining qualitative and quantitative selection
criteria, carmakers are subject to a 40 per cent market share
threshold.
47 Art.6(1)(a) of Reg.1400/2002. The first recognition of the
possible negative cumulative effect of vertical restrictions goes
back to Case 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin [1967] E.C.R.
525; [1968] C.M.L.R. 26. It was recognised that the existence of
many parallel networks of similar exclusive purchasing agree-
ments can have the effect of closing-off competing manu-
facturers. The Court expressed the opinion that if most of the
retailers on a market are tied to a specific manufacturer, it can be
difficult for other manufacturers to enter the same market
because the tied outlets are no longer available to the potential
entrants. For this reasoning within the general competition
policy on vertical restraints see the Guidelines, as n.2 above,
paras 142–146.
48 See judgments in Case 26/76 Metro v Commission (No.1)
[1977] E.C.R. 1875; [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, paras 20 and 21 and
in Case 31/80 L’Ore´al v PVBA [1980] E.C.R. 3775; [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 235, paras 15 and 16. According to the Court, having
regard to the nature of the product concerned, the selective
distribution system should be necessary to preserve the product’s
quality and ensure its proper use. Moreover, the criteria must be
objective and of a qualitative nature, laid down uniformly for all
potential resellers, not applied in a discriminatory manner and
not exceeding what is necessary,
49 Case 74/84 Metro v Commission (No.2) [1986] E.C.R. 3021;
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 118.
50 The cumulative effect hinders in this case not so much—or
not only—price competition at the distribution level, but limits
the diversity of distribution formats and by that affects the
quality of the offers available to consumers.
51 See UK Competition Commission, New Cars, A Report, n.9
above.
52 ibid. para.2.403.
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that the reduction in the transaction and distribution
costs achieved thanks to the selective distribution sys-
tems operated by car manufacturers were not extremely
significant,53 whereas the effects on innovation were
deemed very serious,54 the conclusion was that selective
distribution of the qualitative and quantitative kind in
the car sector operated against the public interest.55 The
policy recommendation was, therefore, that suppliers
should have been prohibited from entering into agree-
ments with retailers which included obligations relating
to standards of presentation and facilities,56 training,
test drives and information systems,57 advertising,58 that
is to withhold supplies on the reason that the retailer
does not fulfil certain qualitative criteria.59
The EU Commission took a different view, as we have
seen above. But the fact that the vast majority of
carmakers are in the progress of adopting a qualitative
selective system, and by that potentially exclude innova-
tive retailers, poses perhaps again the question, if the UK
Competition Commission’s solution would not have
been more appropriate. In order to answer that ques-
tion, though, one should inquire about the effective link
between the lack of innovation and the wide-spread use
of the possibility to select one’s dealers. In other words,
is the main reason why there was no innovation at the
retail level to be seen in the cumulative effect of this
vertical restriction or there might be other—and perhaps
at least as serious—reasons?
If the positive and negative effects of selective dis-
tribution, as well as other vertical restraints, on static
efficiency have been the subject of extensive studies, the
effects on dynamic—or evolutionary—competition are
much less clear. Moreover, mainstream theorising on
organisation focuses on management cost reduction as
the main reason of economic organisation,60 by that
normally neglecting the dynamic perspective on the role
of transaction relations in learning and innovation.61
The issue here is to try to understand how retail
innovations emerge and which role vertical restrictions
like selective distribution—and their cumulative effect—
could have in the process. The question is then also
about the possible impact of selective distribution on the
process by which innovation of retailing emerges. In a
way, what will follow could be seen as a further
reflection on the possible significance of dynamic com-
petition studies for antitrust policy.62
3. The nature and the working of the
innovation process at the distribution level
On the dynamics of innovation in general
Economic theorising on innovation enquires how inno-
vations emerge, and by that the economic system devel-
ops. For a long time innovation research had pictured
economic actors as perfectly rational (‘‘all-knowing’’)
beings for which innovation was just a matter of a
suitable research budget. Instead, recent research, start-
ing from a more realistic picture of economic actors,
considers their capabilities and their ability to imagine
and learn to play a key role in the innovation process.63
Thus, it is the economic agent’s creativity, fuelled by his
knowledge, to be seen as the source of variety that
allows for the generation of novel experiments.64
Which among the novelties brought about by differ-
ent economic agents is bound to prevail depends on the
mechanisms and criteria by which they are selected.
Selection criteria determine in other words the kind of
53 In particular, the UK Competition Commission does not find
that, given the circumstances of the UK retail car market, the free
rider argument could justify the application of vertical restraints,
ibid. para.2.209–2.300.
54 ibid. para.2.304.
55 ibid. para.2.309.
56 ibid. para.2.404.
57 ibid. para.2.408.
58 ibid. para.2.410.
59 See also para.2.403, ‘‘We take the view that it is for retailers
to decide on standards of presentation and facilities according to
their own judgments as to what is required for commercial
success. To enable suppliers to impose their own desired stan-
dards could hinder or prevent the evolution of retailing in line
with consumer preferences and deter entry by retailers with new
ideas, such as the development of virtual dealerships based on
use of the internet. We believe that to allow such developments
would be likely to lead to significant reductions in distribution
costs’’.
60 For an overview of the impact of these studies on antitrust
policy see P.W. Dobson and M. Waterson, Vertical Restraints and
Competition Policy, Office of Fair Trading Research Paper 12,
1996.
61 Innovation is not incorporated into the analysis of economic
organisation essentially because of its enormous complexity, see
O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New
York Free Press, 1985), p.141. The body of literature we will
refer to in the following can thus be seen as a dynamic alternative
to the main stream economics of organisation with its central
focus on the impact of vertical restraints on the efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
62 For some recent contributions see J. Ellig (Ed.), Dynamic
Competition and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press,
2001).
63 See E.S. Andersen, Evolutionary Economics: Post-Schumpe-
terian Contributions (London, 1996), for a broad review of this
literature.
64 Characteristic for the entrepreneur’s task is on one side the
bringing about of completely new resources, that is new ways of
satisfying the needs of other economic agents (such as a new
technological standard), but, more often, of new combinations of
resources necessary to produce a certain good, thus breaking the
routines firms have fashioned to make use of resources. In doing
this, either he is able to generate new ideas, or he is at least able
to see new business opportunities resulting from ideas coming
from outside the organisation, and gone unperceived by others.
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activities to engage in, the kind of resources to acquire
and the relations to establish. The relevant aspect here is
the recognition that what works and what does not, and
what works better than what, must be learned through
actual experience and actual competition.65
The feedback mechanism of the competition process
by which innovations are generated and selected is the
emergence of profits and losses according to the relative
performance of the firm. Profitability is seen as the
reliable indicator of which are the better alternatives
and consequently of where, in the general interest,
resources should be placed. The innovative firm gains
profits above average for having found out before others
did what the ‘‘reality’’ is (preferences, technological
possibilities, resources and their combinations). The
sanction for the less innovative firms, that is for firms
using knowledge which is obsolete, is the transfer of
resources from them, in the form of losses. The constant
threat of incurring losses stimulates exertion. In this
respect, the profit/loss feedback also has the motiva-
tional effect of keeping firms up to the work, enforcing
their ability to predict and plan.66
The last but nonetheless crucial part of the innovation
process comprises the reaction by the firms which have
experienced the ‘‘pecuniary external effects of competi-
tion’’.67 This reaction is very important first of all as a
method by which it comes to the diffusion of the new
knowledge acquired via the process of selection by way
of imitation. Given the opportunity, firms react compet-
ing in activities for which resources are most easily
imitated.68 The second possibility of reaction for the
other firms is being creative themselves, even if it is only
in the way one imitates, thus stimulating further
developments.
The innovation of retail formats: horizontal and
vertical dimensions
The process of innovation we dealt with so far implicitly
considers a single market. Firms come up with different
hypotheses (products, services) about the best way to
satisfy end users’ needs and the end users concerned
choose among these offers, thus rewarding or penalizing
firms according to their relative performance. By way of
the profits/losses feedback, knowledge is diffused and
firms motivated to try out new hypotheses. Now, when
more than one firm is involved in the production and
distribution of a single good—as is indeed normally the
case—the activities performed by different economic
subjects are sort of ‘‘bundled together’’ into the product
or service offered to consumers (end users). Interrelated
organisations, in other words, are involved in creating
and delivering products and services to end users.
The mechanism by which it comes to a specific bundle
of activities, and to many different bundles being offered
in the same market can be described as basically the
same trial and error process we have seen above.69
Hence to concentrate only on the end part of the chain,
producers select among the distribution services offered
by heterogeneous retailers,70 and retailers choose
among the differentiated products available in the
upstream market. Both producers and retailers are thus
at the same time selectors and objects of selection. In
this respect, retailers are often compared to gatekeepers,
since they decide which products consumers will be able
to choose from.71 The bundle (product plus retail
service) is then offered to the consumers, who decide
about its attractiveness relative to competing offers. In
the course of this process, novelties are generated both
at the production (new, differentiated products) and at
the distribution (new, differentiated retail services) level,
and reciprocally selected.72
It is by this very mechanism of variation and selection,65 This is not basically different for technological innovations.
Technological solutions always reach beyond the range of
options that are perfectly understood, or which can be reliably
tested, and in that sense are somewhat blind.
66 Of course, superior profits may at times be undeserved,
merely due to a run of luck, or because of the fact that
consumers, possessing fallible knowledge, have made wrong
decisions; these events could also have long lasting consequences
because of a ‘‘rolling snowball mechanism’’ or ‘‘network effects’’,
see Giovanni and Dosi and R.R. Nelson, ‘‘An Introduction to
Evolutionary Theories in Economics’’ [1994] Journal of Evolu-
tionary Economics, pp. 153–172, at p.167 et seq.
67 M.E. Streit and G. Wegner, ‘‘Wissensmangel, Wissenserwerb
und Wettbewerbsfolgen—Transaktionskosten aus evolutorischer
Sicht’’ [1989] ORDO 183, p. 195.
68 The possible impediments to the imitation of resources are
the object of study within the so called resource based theory of
the firm, see for an in-depth analysis K.R. Conner, ‘‘A Historical
Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of
Thought Within Industrial Organisation Economics: Do We
Have a New Theory of the Firm?’’ [1991] 17 Journal of
Management, pp.121–154.
69 For a detailed explanation of the working of evolutionary
competition processes when more than one market is involved
see W. Kerber, ‘‘Evolutiona¨re Wettbewerbsprozesse u¨ber mehrere
Wirtschaftsstufen: Das Beispiel Industrie—Handel—
Konsumenten’’ [1991] ORDO Bd. 42, pp.325–349.
70 That retailers do not conform to the picture of homogenous
resellers divulgated, among others, by the Chicago School is a
fact hardly disputed in the more recent economic literature, see
P.W. Dobson and M. Waterson, Vertical Restraints and Competi-
tion Policy, n.60 above p.13.
71 See London Economics, Competition in Retailing, Office of
Fair Trading Research Paper No.13, 1997, p.31.
72 There is indeed a growing number of industrial marketing
studies devoted to explaining the evolution of distribution for-
mats in terms of market dynamics, see J. Narus and J. Anderson,
‘‘Rethinking Distribution—Adaptive Channels’’ [1996] Harvard
Business Review, pp.112–120; A. Dubois, L.-E. Gadde and L.G.
Mattsson, ‘‘Activity Structures in Distribution: A Framework for
Analysing Efficiency’’ in Ghauri, P. (Ed.), Advances in Inter-
national Marketing (JAI Press, Cambridge, 1999), Vol.9,
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therefore, that novelties in retailing emerge and are
selected in the market, both by the producers and the
consumers. Essential for the efficient functioning of this
innovation generating mechanism is, as we have seen
above, that the feedback mechanism works properly.
Thus retailers should be rewarded, both by the produc-
ers and the consumers, if their innovation format is
better than the other ones being operated; retailers
employing less innovative formats should suffer an
economic loss, and this stimulates their reaction, either
by imitation or by bringing about something new.
But innovations in retailing very often are not just
new, better ways of performing one’s function relative to
direct competitors: they are better ways of combining
producers/retailers resources. Retailers may overtake
functions previously exercised by producers as in the
case of products branding, or producers’ functions
previously exercised by retailers, an example here may
be shelf replenishing. Changes in the relationship with
the producers can best be thought of, in this respect, as
an experimental search and learning process to discover
possibilities for improvements in efficiency through a
better bundling of their respective resources. More
generally, it is the process of integration and disintegra-
tion itself that can be thought of in these terms.73
Thus, thanks to vertical arrangements between manu-
facturers and retailers, alternative ways of combining
their respective resources can be tried out and better,
more efficient combinations discovered. The parties can
for example find out that it is better, more efficient, if it
is the distributor that explains to the consumers the
intrinsic characteristics of the product and the distribu-
tion format is modified accordingly. In this respect,
innovations in retailing can have either a horizontal or a
vertical dimension, depending on whether they result in
a direct improvement of the distributor’s performance
relative to his competitors or in a better combination of
his resources with the manufacturers’.74
There is indeed a very considerable and rapidly
growing literature on the importance of vertical rela-
tions as a way for discovering better ways of bundling
firms’ resources.75 The starting point is the belief that
what activities a firm engages in and how it distributes
activities between itself and outside partners depends on
considerations concerning its survival in the market.
Central to this approach is the understanding that very
important for survival in dynamic competition is the
firm’s concentration on its core competencies. These are
commonly depicted as firm’s specific combinations of
complementary76 resources drawing on the same capa-
bilities,77 which underpin its productive activity. Firms
then have to fall back on other institutions like vertical
arrangements to get access to complementary assets of
the firms which draw on different capabilities and reach
a qualitative co-ordination of their activities. Organisa-
tional arrangements must thus be devised to provide for
the future availability of products complementary to its
own, highly specific to the requirements of the firm (not
general in demand).78
Summing up, innovations in retailing emerge as the
result of competition processes involving more than one
market along a vertical chain. Retailers try to improve
their performance relative to their direct competitors by
changing their business formats, that is by modifying the
level and quality of retail service, and producers and
consumers choose among them according to their needs
(preferences). In this respect, innovations of distribution
formats emerge because of the existence of competition
among retailers, both in their capacity of buyers and of
pp.43–62; A. Nyberg, Innovation in Distribution Channels. An
Evolutionary Approach (EFI, Stockholm, 1998).
73 See V. Mahnke, ‘‘The Process of Vertical Dis-Integration: An
Evolutionary Perspective on Outsourcing’’ [2000] Working
Paper Series, Department of Industrial Economics & Strategy,
Copenhagen Business School, p.8.
74 Of course, an innovation in retailing can have both dimen-
sions, as when a distributor is able to improve his ‘‘horizontal’’
performance relative to his competitors just because he recog-
nises synergies with the manufacturer’s resources gone unper-
ceived by others.
75 Reference is made here again to researches stemming out of
the resource based theory of the firm, see n.68 above.
76 Two activities are complementary when the marginal benefit
of being able to change one activity is larger the higher the
frequency of change of the other activity.
77 G.B. Richardson, ‘‘The Organisation of Industry’’ [1972]
Economic Journal, Vol.82, p.883, at p.888, refers to capabilities
as to knowledge, expertise and skill.
78 Vertical arrangements can go even a step further. Not only do
they allow for qualitative co-ordination and, through the con-
tinuous interaction of the parties, for the discovery of better
combinations of resources, but they might even be the means by
which genuinely new resources are discovered. Many authors
explain the generation of much of modern technology by point-
ing to the existence of vertical arrangements allowing for the
discovery of new combinations of resources or new resources. It
is in fact increasingly the case that technological innovations do
not stem from a single firm, but are the results of a work
accomplished by several firms placed at different stages of the
‘‘innovation pipeline’’, which combining their resources (technol-
ogies, capabilities) have been able to create and implement
novelties, that is new combinations of resources or genuinely
new resources. On the other hand, radical innovations could be
facilitated by active central direction because of the need to
control for the strong interdependencies which characterise
complex problems, see L. Marengo, ‘‘Decentralisation and Mar-
ket Mechanisms in Collective Problem-Solving’’ DRUID’s Sum-
mer Conference, 2000, p.4. In more general terms, this leads one
to view ‘‘the generation of capabilities as dependent on the
division of labour in the generation and exploitation of knowl-
edge and on the particular methods for co-ordinating the division
of labour’’, see R. Coombs and S. Metcalfe, Distributed Capabil-
ities and the Governance of the Firm, CRIC Discussion Paper
No.16. Centre for Research on Innovation and Competition
(CRIC), University of Manchester, UK, 1998, p.14.
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sellers. But we have also seen that innovations in
retailing can be the result of vertical arrangements
between manufacturers and distributors thanks to
which new combinations of resources are discovered.
On the whole, there can be many reasons why the
process of innovation of distribution forms does not
work properly. High concentration on the retail market
could be one of the reasons,79 as well as rigidities in the
capacity of retailers to bring about novelties, due, for
example, to routine dependency in response to very
uncertain environments.80 In the following we will try
to enquire the specific role selective distribution could
have, that is to verify, elaborating on current literature,
the impact of these vertical restraints on the process by
which innovations emerge and diffuse throughout the
system.
4. On the possible effects of selective
distribution arrangements on the innovation
process at the distribution level
We have seen in the previous section that the process by
which innovation of distribution formats emerge can be
considered as one of the competitive processes taking
place on the market. Thanks to it, new, specific knowl-
edge is created about the best way to satisfy consum-
ers’81 and manufacturers’ needs. In the following we
will try to enquire about the possible role that selective
distribution arrangements of a qualitative kind could
play in the process: do they foster or hinder this
competitive process by which new, better, distribution
formats are discovered?
What emerges from the economic literature on inno-
vation is that there can be dynamic reasons to introduce
vertical restrictions. First of all, attention has been
devoted to the fact that a key element of innovation
creating arrangements (that is research and development
projects) is to have a cognitive distance that fosters
learning between the parties, without hindering commu-
nication. Condition for this is that parties invest in
mutual understanding for crossing ‘‘cognitive distance’’,
but at the same time keep distant enough so that from
their relation something new can emerge.82 Learning to
acquire the suitable cognitive distance requires some
time and closeness, so that, for example, exclusivities
might be necessary. Market-like incentives might in fact
produce destructive effects on the learning and co-
operation activities which determine the firm’s long term
performance.
Moreover, innovation might also need some stabilis-
ing circumstances.83 For example, in very innovative
environments vertical restrictions like exclusive distribu-
tion (distributor is assigned exclusivity over a geo-
graphical area or over a particular class of consumers or
goods) can mean an important reduction in vulnerabil-
ity. They provide a degree of stability, foresight, which
favours planning—a firm bringing about a new distribu-
tion format will expect it in due course to be superseded,
but know that it will take time to displace it.
A similar explanation points to the fact that vertical
restraints can also protect against knowledge leakage.
They provide for private firm knowledge not to be
exposed to too rapid obsolescence. This protection
becomes relatively more important when competitors
are likely to command requisite ‘‘absorptive capacity’’
that makes imitation a viable competitive threat.
Instead, it is of minor relevance due to a rapid obsoles-
cence of capabilities in a world of radical speed of
change, because, in that case, the specific knowledge is
obsolete by the time that it reaches a competitor and can
be embodied in products or retail services and brought
to the market.84
For what concerns in particular qualitative selection
arrangements, a dynamic explanation can be presented
in the following terms. The innovation of one’s perform-
ance often requires changes in complementary resources
which are under the control of economic agents belong-
ing to different stages of production. The problem can
be also formulated in terms of the necessity of an
innovation to fit into a ‘‘context of use’’ in order for it to
be efficiently exploited, that is, specific systems of use,
79 See W. Kerber, ‘‘Evolutiona¨re Wettbewerbsprozesse u¨ber
mehrere Wirtschaftsstufen’’, n.69 above; W. Kerber and N.J.
Saam, ‘‘Competition as a Test of Hypotheses: Simulation of
Knowledge-Generating Market Processes’’ [2001] Journal of
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Vol.4, No.3.
80 The more uncertain the environment, the more firms tend to
engage in activities in which they are already competent, thus
exploiting past knowledge for successive refinements rather than
venturing in risky exploration. In the economic literature, this is
known as the problem of ‘‘path dependency’’.
81 In this respect, the retailers’ role is very important. Being
normally closer to consumers than the manufacturers, they can
find out circumstances of time and space that, possibly, would
not have been found otherwise. See for the understanding of
competition as a discovery process F.A. von Hayek, ‘‘Economics
and Knowledge’’ [1937] Economica 4, pp.33–54 and, by the
same author, ‘‘Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren’’, in
Freiburger Studien (Tu¨bingen 1969, Mohr).
82 B. Nooteboom, Learning and Innovation in Organisations
and Economics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), p.72.
83 G.B. Richardson, ‘‘Evolution, Structure and Strategy’’ paper
produced for the Druid’s Nelson and Winter Conference, 2001,
p.11.
84 See B. Nooteboom, ‘‘Innovation and Inter-Firm Linkages:
New Implications for Policy’’ [1999] Research Policy, 28:
793–805 with reference to product innovation.
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production and distribution need to be developed for
the purpose.85 Thus, some changes in a product’s char-
acteristics, for example, might require retailers of that
product to modify the way they perform their activities.
Changes must be co-ordinated between different eco-
nomic agents, implying dynamic transaction costs of
informing and persuading suppliers to cooperate in
changing their activities.86 These costs can be high,
especially when the environment is very turbulent. In
this case, vertical leadership, implying vertical restraints
like obligations for the retailers to conform to the
supplier’s changing market image, could help keeping
these costs low.
Even more important, perhaps, is that selection as
such is vital for the good functioning of the competition
process. In this respect, producers should be able to pick
out what they think is the most suitable distribution
service among the ones offered by different retailers, and
by that stimulate dynamic competition at the retail
level.87
One could argue, though, that leaving retailers free to
decide how to sell manufacturers’ goods, that is totally
banning qualitative vertical restraints, is the right solu-
tion if the goal is the promotion of innovation in the
retail sector.88 In that case, it would be totally for the
consumers to decide if they like a distribution format or
not. On the other side, as we have seen above, innova-
tion in retailing very often is not only about discovering
and fulfilling consumers’ needs, but about finding new,
better ways of combining producers’ and retailers’
capabilities (resources).89 For this competition process
to work, suppliers should be able to exercise their
subjective choice as to which retailers they decide to
supply.
If the freedom by the manufacturer to decide to whom
to sell its goods is a key element assuring the functioning
of the competition process by which innovations in
retailing emerge, the same does not seem to apply to the
obligation on the side of the selected retailer not to sell
to unauthorised retailers. The fact that selected dealers
are not allowed to sell new cars to unauthorised resellers
could exercise a major constraint on their growth
potential and therefore on their capacity to act innova-
tively on the retail market.90 The possibility for unau-
thorised dealers to be supplied by members of the
official manufacturer’s network would also encourage
experimenting of independent retail services, from
which the carmakers will be able to choose in the future.
The sale to unauthorised dealers should nevertheless
provide that they comply with minimum ‘‘technical’’
standards, such as for example regarding cars’ safety,91
that is standards which are different, objective (and
much less demanding) than the qualitative criteria
which inform manufacturer’s choice of the members of
its own retail network.
In this respect, the requirements set out by the Court
of Justice92 that:
u the selective distribution system should be neces-
sary to preserve the product’s quality and ensure its
proper use;
u the criteria must be objective and of a qualitative
nature, laid down uniformly for all potential
resellers;
u the criteria should not be applied in a discrim-
inatory manner; and
u should not exceed what is necessary
appear problematic from an evolutionary perspective.
For once, the Court’s requirements seem to be too
stringent as applied to the manufacturer—dealer rela-
tionship (the carmaker should be able to choose who-
ever he thinks to be suitable for the purpose) and too
broad as applied to the authorised dealers—not author-
ised dealers relationship (only the obligation to comply
with minimum, technical standards seems appropri-
ate).
Summing up, we have seen that there could be
dynamic explanations of vertical restraints, that is
explanations pointing at their positive effects on the
process by which innovations emerge. This applies in
particular to the restriction of the carmakers’ supplies
only to approved dealers. We have also seen that, in
order to stimulate the innovation process at the retail
level, it could be advisable that authorised dealers be
free to sell also to unauthorised retailers, provided that
85 See B. Nooteboom, ‘‘Uncertainty, Cognitive Distance and
Discovery’’ in Uncertainty in Economic Decision Making: Ambi-
guity, Mental Models and Institutions (K. Nielsen ed., 2002,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
86 R. Langlois and P. Robertson, Firms, Markets and Economic
Change (Routledge, London, 1995), p.35.
87 Also the binding of sale with service could seem to make
economic sense, because of cross-fertilisation of knowledge
between selling and repairing.
88 See above, at pp.174 et seq.
89 See above, at p.177.
90 Approved dealers should also in principle be kept free to
experiment their own ideas, also when what they intend to do
varies from carmaker’s official line, as long as this does not
prejudice the interests of the network as a whole.
91 Comprising inter alia a basic mechanical knowledge.
92 See n.48 above.
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these last resellers comply with minimum, strictly tech-
nical requirements.
5. On the complexity of the dynamic
assessment of vertical restraints
So far, we have considered qualitative selective distribu-
tion obligations in a sort of vacuum, that is separate
from other vertical restrictions the same distribution
arrangement may provide for. But an in-depth antitrust
assessment should consider the entire ‘‘bundle’’ of obli-
gations at once. In fact, a combination of vertical
restraints could be more—or less—problematic than
each vertical restraint individually taken.93 Other verti-
cal restraints may in fact also have an impact on the
competition process by which new forms of retailing
emerge. For example, full-line forcing can restrict entry
by undertakings which wish to specialise in more lim-
ited product ranges, whereas quantity forcing can pre-
vent entry by small-scale retailers, who may happen to
be more innovative than established resellers.
Moreover, as we have seen above, essential for the
efficient functioning of this innovation generating mech-
anism is that the feedback mechanism works properly.
The profits/losses feedback is very important so that
parties (firms) can realise which hypotheses are the
better ones (information function)94 and also get moti-
vated/forced to produce better ones (motivation func-
tion). It follows that in order for the innovation process
to work, it is very important that suppliers, and not only
consumers, are able to choose between different dis-
tribution formats, because in this way they reward
retailers for their innovative efforts. Retailers should be
rewarded both by the producers and the consumers, if
their innovation format is better than the other ones
being operated; retailers employing less innovative for-
mats should suffer an economic loss, and this stimulates
their reaction, either by imitation or by bringing about
something new. Accordingly, suppliers should not be
prohibited from entering into agreements that give
retailers an advantage because they provide peculiar,
innovative services, for example facilitating the suppli-
ers’ tasks and reducing their costs. An inappropriate
application of the discrimination prohibitions, that are
part of most antitrust legislations, could therefore run
the risk of hindering the good functioning of the sanc-
tion/reward mechanism.95
At least as important is that undertakings wishing to
try out their ideas on the market are able to find
sufficient undertakings in the upstream market at least
willing to consider the supply of goods, possibly not
discontinuing the supply to more traditional formats. At
the stage of experimentation, existing linkages between
economic agents can in fact provide obstacles for firms
willing to try out new combinations of resources, and
less incentives to do so. So when most of the manu-
facturers are tied to specific retailers, the innovating
distributor can find it very difficult to experiment his
idea of new resource combinations. This would seem to
speak against long time contracts between manufac-
turers and distributors, and in favour of relatively easy
rules for termination of existing contracts. In light of
this, the obligation contained in the Regulation that a
supplier who wishes to terminate a dealer agreement
must give detailed, objective,96 and transparent reasons
in writing could appear too strict. Besides, if distributors
are truly selected in view of their own, already existing
qualifications, the sunk costs arguments in favour of
dealers’ protection could become less relevant.97
Also, an appropriate assessment of vertical restraints
from a dynamic or evolutionary perspective should
comprise the analysis of the impact of vertical restric-
tions on the competition process on the upstream
market, that is, in our case, the carmakers’ market.
Thus, for instance, full-range forcing, that is the obliga-
tion by the dealer to push all sorts of models without
being able to choose among carmaker’s products, could
have both a negative and a positive impact on products’
innovation. On the one side, in fact, it could be argued
that, because of full-range forcing, carmakers are pro-
tected by their dealers’ direct pressures to provide for
the best possible products and that consumers’ are not
objectively informed by the dealer about the best models
available. On the other side, the supplier, given the
substantial costs and risks involved in developing and
93 See also Guidelines, n.2 above, at para.119(6).
94 Since an entire bundle of hypotheses is tested at the same
time, it can be difficult for the firm to know exactly which
performance was especially good or successful.
95 See W. Kerber, ‘‘Evolutiona¨re Wettbewerbsprozesse u¨ber
mehrere Wirtschaftsstufen’’, n.69 above, p.336.
96 The question as to whether or not it is necessary to reorganise
the network should be broadly considered a subjective one,
because it may depend on reasons that the manufacturer might
not be able to explain, pertaining to his intuitive assessment of a
competitive situation or of specific dealer’s characteristics.
97 Moreover, if the supplier cannot expect the retailer to invest
much in his undertaking, this would mean that the supplier will
be forced to select the retailer that, by its nature, without major
investments, provides the service the manufacturer is looking
for.
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manufacturing new models, could need guaranteed out-
lets for its products, otherwise he would be less inno-
vative.
From what we have just seen, some more general
reflections about antitrust law could now be formu-
lated. As it is well known, the economic theories by
which this body of law is informed pay a great attention
to the negative impact of economic agents’ decisions on
the allocation of present resources, but fail to realise
how such decisions could influence the process by which
innovation is generated. Surprisingly, though, relatively
few efforts have been put into trying to re-orient
competition policy so as to embrace a more dynamic
perspective.98 The fact that the functioning of competi-
tion as a discovery procedure is very complex, and only
partly understood, has certainly been influential in
keeping endeavours in this direction scarce. Recent
economic theorising on innovation could well give
decisive impulses to its long-awaited process of ‘‘mod-
ernisation’’ of antitrust law.
In particular, elaborating on the more recent eco-
nomic literature on innovation and related studies, we
have seen that, on the one side, economic agents facing
the important task of bringing about new ideas face
problems that not even the transaction costs framework
is able to capture. Not being able to grasp, because of its
static stance, innovation based co-ordination problems,
antitrust policy could run the serious risk of ending up
prohibiting practices which are instead beneficial for
competition.99 On the other side, vertical restraints
could hamper dynamic competition processes in ways
that the static analysis is unable to reveal. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to conclude that the dynamic—or
evolutionary—appraisal of vertical restraints, in spite of
its undeniable complicated nature, should deserve a
central role in antitrust law.
6. Conclusions
Despite the complexity of the required assessment of
vertical restrictions in evolutionary terms, and the unli-
keness of clear cut policy solutions,1 it appears that the
dynamic appraisal of vertical restraints should play a
major role in antitrust analysis. At least, it should come
to complement the more static assessment that results
from the EU Commission general policy approach on
vertical restraints. From what we have seen above, the
following indications for competition policy in the EU
car sector could follow.
The innovation of retail formats has been presented as
the result of a complex process, involving more than one
stage of the production and distribution chain. It
involves three basic steps, that is the experimentation of
new ideas, their selection, and the provision of a reward/
sanction mechanism fostering innovation and/or imita-
tion. For this process to work in a satisfactory way, all
of these steps are equally important. Thus, for example,
selection without real choice, because of the homoge-
neity of the options available, does not produce actual
innovation.
From the above consideration, we have been able to
draw the following conclusions.
First, the carmakers’ freedom to select the retailers
whom to sell cars has appeared very important in order
to stimulate the competition process by which new retail
formats emerge. This freedom should not be subject to
any third party’s (as for instance a Court’s) assessment
as to the appropriateness of the choice given the nature
of the product or the carmakers’ overall marketing
policy. This should include the possibility by the manu-
facturer to price retailers differently, according to the
specific service they are able to provide.
Secondly, and conversely, because of the need to
assure the heterogeneity of the offers available, there are
reasons to consider the authorised dealers’ obligation
not to sell to unauthorised retailers problematic from an
evolutionary point of view.
Finally, we have noticed that existing linkages can be
an obstacle to the process of experimentation of new
ideas, and therefore short term contracts and not too
burdensome termination rules should be encouraged.
98 See H. Arndt, Scho¨pferischer Wettbewerb und klassenlose
Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1952); E. Hoppmann, Wirtschaftsordnung
und Wettbewerb (Baden-Baden, 1988) and W. Kerber, Evolutio-
na¨re Marktprozesse und Nachfragemacht (Baden-Baden, 1989),
for some important exceptions.
99 See T.M. Jorde and D.J. Teece, Antitrust Policy and Innova-
tion: Taking Account of Performance Competition and Com-
petitor Co-operation [1991] Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 147, pp.118–144.
1 This could offer an opportunity to meditate anew on Friedrich
A. von Hayek’s well-known assertion that ‘‘The curious task of
economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know
about what they imagine they can design’’, in The Fatal Conceit:
The Errors of Socialism (W.W. Bartley III ed. 1988, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
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